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A Medical-Legal Dilemma: When Can
"Inappropriate" Nutrition and Hydration
Be Removed in Indiana?
KATHLEEN M. ANDERSON*
INTRODUCTION
The debate over the withdrawal of life support has focused on the forgoing
of artificial nutrition and hydration.' For some, providing food and water
to any patient fulfills a necessary requirement of both supportive and
comfort care.2 Admittedly, supplying nutrition and hydration is appropriate
for most patients.3 Yet many conclude that when the burden of receiving
artificial nutrition and hydration exceeds the benefits, certain critically ill
patients should have the option of considering the consequences.4 In Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Ithe Supreme Court supported
the position that artificial nutrition and hydration may be considered the
same as other medical procedures. 6 The Court then held that a state may
constitutionally require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes
before allowing the removal of life support. 7
The Supreme Court's approach to artificial nutrition and hydration con-
forms with the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1989,
Hanover College.
I would like to thank Professor Roger Dworkin for his extensive comments on the drafts
of this Note. I also wish to express my thanks to Frank D. Byrne, M.D., Richard D. Robinson,
Esq., and the Midwest Cardiovascular Research Foundation.
1. See, e.g., A. Mmsu, Tn RisOrT To Dm 124 (1989); American Med. A., Council on
Sci. Affairs and Council on Ethical and Jud. Affairs, Persistent Vegetative State and the
Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263 J. A.M.A. 426 (1990); Beatty, Comment,
Artificial Nutrition and the Terminally Ill: How Should Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. L.
Ray. 419, 420 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, HAsrTlos CENTR REP., Oct. 1983, at 22;
see also infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. See generally Beatty, supra note 1, at 421.
3. Lynn, Introduction and Overview, in BY No ExTRAoRDINARY MEAis: THE CHOICE TO
Foitoo Lwn-SusTAImwo FOOD AND WATER 1, 1 (J. Lynn ed. 1986) [hereinafter BY No
ExTRAoRDmrARY MEANs].
4. E.g., id.
5. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
6. Id. The Court assumed that even a competent patient has the constitutional right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 2852. Whether this assumption will continue and how
it may influence the question of life-sustaining treatments, including nutrition and hydration,
will be uncertain until a case directly confronts it.
7. Id. at 2852.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Judicial Affairs' conclusion that "[iife [sustaining] medical treatment includes
medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition
or hydration." ' Most lower courts and most in the medical community have
also agreed with this conclusion.9
Many states approach the problem of medical decision making for an
incompetent patient with two statutes-living will statutes and durable power
of attorney statutes. Living will statutes allow a competent individual to
execute a written statement directing that, in the event she becomes incom-
petent and terminally ill, life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn.10 Living wills allow individuals to make important health care
8. AMERICAN MED. A., CuRENr OPINIONS OF THE CoUNCm ON ETHiCAL AND JuDiciAL
AsnAins 13 (1986) ("In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician
should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens.").
9. See infra note 76.
10. See Areen, Advanced Directives Under State Law and Judicial Decisions, 19 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 91, 93-97 (1991) for a list of living will statutes. I have updated that
listing to the current date: Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990);
Rights of the Terminally Ill, ALAsKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1991); Arizona Medical Treatment
Decision Act, Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); Arkansas Rights of the
Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp.
1991); California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp.
1991); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, Cow. Ray. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113
(1987 & Supp. 1989); Removal of Life Support Systems, CONN. Gm. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570
to -575 (West Supp. 1991); Delaware Death with Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§
2501-2508 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-
2421 to -2430 (1989); Life Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-
.17 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12
(1987); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act, HAw. Ray. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp.
1990); Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1991);
Illinois Living Will Act, ILLx. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 paras. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991);
Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IN. CODE §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (1988
& Supp. 1990); Life-Sustaining Procedure Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-A.11 (West 1989);
Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 65-28,109 (1985); Kentucky
Living Will Act, Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-.644 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990);
Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, LA. REv. STAT. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10
(West Supp. 1991); Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-
A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (Supp. 1990); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, Mn. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); Adult Health Care Decisions Act, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1991); Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mechanisms Act, Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1991); Missouri Life-Support Declarations Act, Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -111, 50-9-201 to -206 (1991); Nevada Withholding and
Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, Nm,. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540-.690 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1989); New Hampshire Living Wills Act, N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to
:16 (1990); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-2 to -11 (1991); North
Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1990); Uniform
Rights of the Terminally Ili Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991); Oklahoma
Natural Death Act, OL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1991); Oregon Rights
with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.605-.650 (1990); Death with
Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1990); Tennessee Right to
Natural Death Act, TEN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (1990); Texas Natural Death Act,
Tax. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon 1991); Utah Personal Choice
[Vol. 67:479
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decisions prior to incompetency."1 These prior statements not only give
individuals some assurance that they have communicated their wishes, but
they also give health care providers and family members an indication of
the individual's health care preferences. Living wills may be particularly
important when a patient does not have family members that can make
health care decisions for her or when family members are in disagreement
about health care options. Living wills can thus be valuable health care
decision-making tools.
However, while living wills can provide an invaluable indication of an
incompetent patient's wishes, limits have been placed on them. Despite what
may be termed a medical "consensus" on the issue of artificial nutrition
and hydration, many state legislatures differentiate artificial nutrition and
hydration from other forms of medical treatment in living will statutes.
12
Most statutes apply only to "life-prolonging procedures" or "life-sustaining
treatment." Some states exclude the provision of artificial nutrition and
hydration from the definition of a "life-prolonging procedure" or "life-
sustaining treatment."' 3 When states exclude artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion from the definition of life-prolonging procedures, the living will statutes
do not authorize the withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration.' 4
Health care durable power of attorney statutes allow surrogate decision
makers to make necessary health care decisions when a patient becomes
and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1991); Vermont Terminal
Care Document, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); Natural Death Act of Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1991); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH. Rv.
CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1991); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA. CODE
§§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1991 & Supp. 1991); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
154.01-.15 (West 1989); Wyoming Living Will Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (Supp.
1988).
11. For a critique of living wills, see Bopp & Marzen, Cruzan: Facing the Inevitable, 19
LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 37, 47 (1991); Lynn, Why I Don't Have a Living Will, 19 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 101 (1991).
12. Those statutes that treat artificial nutrition and hydration differently include: Am.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-103(7), -104(2.5)(2); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-570(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.03(3), 765.075; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)(A),
(B); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-2; IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(3); IND. CODE § 16-8-11-4; IoWA
CODE § 144A.2(5); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701(4); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 5-605(1); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 137-H:2(II); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4); OKu.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(4);
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.605(3); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-
103(5), (6); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b).
Some state legislatures specifically allow the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration.
For example, Alaska's statute requires the declarant to expressly note whether she "desire[s]
that nutrition or hydration (food and water) be provided by gastric tube or intravenously if
necessary." ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c). In Oklahoma, these directives are permitted in limited
circumstances. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3080.1-.5.
13. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)(A), (B); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504; MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(1); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2(11).
14. See, e.g., the statutes cited supra note 13.
1992]
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incompetent. 5 In some respects, health care providers may find surrogate
decision maker appointments more helpful and flexible than living will
declarations. 6 Incompetency, not terminal illness, triggers the appointments,
and surrogate decisions are not limited to life-sustaining treatment. However,
these surrogate statutes may not mention artificial nutrition and hydration
specifically, and they may indicate that prior state law on the withholding
or withdrawal of life support has not been changed. 7
Indiana treats artificial nutrition and hydration differently than other
medical treatments under the Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures
Act ("Living Wills Act"). 18 Under the Living Wills Act, a person may
execute a directive either to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures
or to provide all life-sustaining procedures. 9 However, the Living Wills Act
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332-.353 (Supp. 1990); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2430-2444,
2500-2508 (West Supp. 1991); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 15-14-501 to -502 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2205 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 804-1 to -12 (Smith-Hurd Supp._1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-
12-1 to -13 (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625 to -632 (Supp. 1990); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.970 -.986 (Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501
(Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 417-41-151 to -183 (Supp. 1991); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
449.800-.860 (Michie Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-01 to -18 (1991); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1337.11-.17 (Anderson Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.505-.585 (1990); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604 (Purdon Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.10-1 to -2 (1989);
S.D. COD. LAws ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to -2.8 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 346-201 to -
215 (1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§
3451-3467 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.10(3) (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-
30A-1 to -20 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01-.80 (West Supp. 1990).
16. Justice O'Connor noted that "procedures for surrogate decisionmaking ... may be a
valuable additional safeguard of the patient's interest in directing his medical care." Cruzan,
110 S. Ct. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Bopp & Marzen, supra note 11, at 48
(offering a critique of durable power of attorney for health care statutes).
17. Indiana's Health Care Consent Law is an example of this:
Limitations on applicability and effect of chapter. (a) This chapter does not
affect Indiana law concerning an individual's authorization to make a health care
decision for the individual or another individual, or to provide, withdraw, or
withhold medical care necessary to prolong or sustain life.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-11. However, Indiana recently incorporated by reference a definition
of "health care" that includes different means of administering artificial nutrition and
hydration. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-2-4 (Burns Supp. 1991). See infra notes 153-63 and
accompanying text.
18. IND. CODE §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22.
19. The Living Wills Act states:
"Life-prolonging procedure" defined.-As used in this chapter, "life-prolonging
procedure" means any medical procedure, treatment, or intervention that:
(1) Uses mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant
a vital function; and
(2) Serves to prolong the dying process.
"Life-prolonging procedure" does not include the provision of appropriate nu-
trition and hydration, the administration of medication, or the performance of
any medical procedure necessary to provide comfort care or to eliminate pain.
IND. CODE § 16-8-11-4. The Act requires that the Living Will Declaration be "substantially"
[Vol. 67:479
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does not make clear whether artificial nutrition and hydration may ever be
withheld or withdrawn under the Act.
Indiana's Health Care Consent Law ("Consent Law"), 20 a health care
durable power of attorney statute, allows health care providers to turn to
appointed "health care representatives" or to family members to make
health care decisions for incompetent patients. 2' Until recently, it was unclear
whether a "health care representative" could authorize the withholding or
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration under the Consent Law.2
However, the Indiana Supreme Court put an end to speculation in In re
Lawrance,2 explaining that "[tihe very broad scope which the legislature
gave the [Consent Law] also persuades us that its procedures may be applied
to decisions concerning artificial nutrition and hydration .... " The court
in the following form:
LIVING WILL DECLARATION
Declaration made this .. day of (month, year). I, -, being at least
eighteen (18) years old and of sound mind, willfully and voluntarily make known
my desires that my dying shall not be artificially prolonged under the circum-
stances set forth below, and I declare:
If at any time I have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified in writing
to be a terminal condition by my attending physician, and my attending physician
has determined that my death will occur within a short period of time, and the
use of fife-prolonging procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the
dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that
I be permitted to die naturally with only the provision of appropriate nutrition
and hydration and the administration of medication and the performance of any
medical procedure necessary to provide me with comfort care or to alleviate pain.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of life-
prolonging procedures, it is my intention that this declaration be honored by my
family and physician as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical
or surgical treatment and accept the consequences of the refusal.
I understand the full import of this declaration.
Signed
City, County, and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me, and I believe (him/her) to be
of sound mind. I did not sign the declarant's signature above for or at the
direction of the declarant. I am not a parent, spouse, or child of the declarant.
I am not entitled to any part of the declarant's estate or directly financially
responsible for the declarant's medical care. I am competent and at least eighteen
(18) years old.
Witness Date
Witness Date
IND. CODE § 16-8-11-12. See also § 16-8-11-12 for the form of a Life Prolonging Procedures
Declaration.
20. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-12-1 to -13.
21. Id.
22. See Thompson, Indiana's New Health Care Consent Act: A Guiding Light for the
Health Care Provider, 21 IND. L. Ray. 181, 199-200 (1988).
23. 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991).
24. Id.
1992]
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concluded that "the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration...
is medical treatment which can be refused."5 Strengthening the supreme
court's position, the newly enacted Power of Attorney Act, 26 incorporated
by reference into the Health Care Consent Law, clarifies the Consent Law's
broad definition of "health care." 27 "Health care" includes "nutrition and
hydration through intravenous, endotracheal, or nasogastric tubes."' '  In-
diana thus faces two health care statutes, the Living Wills Act and the
Health Care Consent Law, that may conflict with each other.
This Note focuses on one general question: May artificial nutrition and
hydration ever be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient under
the Indiana Living Wills Act? The answer to this general question lies in
the resolution of three sub-issues: (1) What is "appropriate nutrition and
hydration" under the Living Wills Act? (2) May a "health care represen-
tative" under the Health Care Consent Law authorize the removal of
appropriate artificial nutrition and hydration that could not be removed
under the Living Wills Act? (3) How do the Living Wills Act and the
Consent Law interact on the subject of artificial nutrition and hydration?
A reading of "life-prolonging procedures" under the Indiana Living Wills
Act should allow the withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration when they are not medically appropriate. Physicians can turn to
health care representatives under the Consent Law when questions about
the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration arise. A reading of the two
statutes should yield a consistent result. If the artificial nutrition and
hydration cannot be removed under the Living Wills Act, then what may
25. Id.
26. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-1-1 to 30-5-10-4 (Burns Supp. 1991); see also IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-12-13.
27. The Consent Law defines "health care" as "any care, treatment, service, or procedure
to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental condition." IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-12-1. Section 16 of the new Power of Attorney Act reads:
If the attorney in fact has the authority to consent to or refuse health care under
section 16(2) [IC § 30-5-5-16(2)] of this chapter, the attorney in fact may be
empowered to ask, in the name of the principal, for health care to be withdrawn
or withheld when it is not beneficial, or when any benefit is outweighed by the
demands of the treatment and death may result. To empower the attorney in
fact to act under this section, the following language must be included in an
appointment under IC 16-8-12 [Health Care Consent Law] in substantially the
same form set forth below:
I authorize my health care representative to make decisions in my best interest
concerning withdrawal or withholding of health care. If at any time, based on
my previously expressed preferences and the diagnosis and prognosis, my health
care representative is satisfied that certain health care is not or would not be
beneficial or that such health care is or would be excessively burdensome, then
my health care representative may express my will that such health care be
withheld or withdrawn and may consent on my behalf that any or all health care
be discontinued or not instituted, even if death may result.
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-5-17.
28. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-2-4.
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be done by a health care representative cannot be done by the individual
herself under her living will.
Part I of this Note examines the background of withholding and with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment generally and approaches the clinical and
policy responses to the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Part
II discusses the judicial and legislative responses to the removal of artificial
nutrition and hydration, focusing on Indiana's response. Part III deals with
the questions raised by the Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Pro-
cedures Act and Health Care Consent Law and presents a consistent
interpretation of the two statutes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Withholding or Withdrawal of Life Support Generally
Historically, most people died of diseases or health conditions that pro-
gressed rapidly and left little opportunity for long-term maintenance. 29 Today
at least eighty percent of Americans die in hospitals and long-term health
care institutions, 0 where medical technology can sustain them longer than
ever before.31 In this context, decisions to withhold or withdraw life support
occur frequently. 32 Unfortunately, many terminally ill patients are unable
to participate in the discussion of life support options, 33 including options
that some patients would consider unduly burdensome.
Frequently, patients, families, and health care providers must make de-
cisions about mechanical ventilators, dialysis, cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
balloon pumps, intrusive palliative procedures, pacemakers, vasopressors,
29. See generally Capron, Historical Overview: Law and Public Perceptions, in By No
ExTRAoRDINARY MEANS, supra note 3, at 11.
30. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S Comm'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL BEHAvIoRAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LUE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
16-18 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S Comm 'N]. Heart disease, cancer, cerebrovascular disease,
and other conditions which develop relatively slowly have replaced communicable diseases as
leading causes of death. Id. at 16.
31. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990).
32. This conclusion is supported by a study conducted at two teaching hospitals of the
University of California at San Francisco. The researchers concluded that, although life-
sustaining care was withheld or withdrawn infrequently in the intensive care unit, the decisions
precipitated approximately half of the deaths in the intensive care units of the hospitals studied.
Smedira, Evans, Grais, Cohen, Lo, Cooke, Schechter, Fink, Epstein-Jaffe, May & Luce,
Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from the Critically Ill, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED.
309, 309 (1990).
For a general description of the decision-making process at an Indiana hospital, see Anderson,
Byrne & Robinson, Beyond Cruzan: Making Life Support Decisions, 83 IND. MED. 838 (1990).
33. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 30, at 120-26; Brock, Taking Human Life, 95 ETHICS
851, 855 (1985).
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blood, antibiotics, and insulin. 4 Since In re Quinlan35 in 1976, courts have
articulated critically ill patients' rights to forego life-sustaining treatment in
different situations. Courts generally agree that life support may be withheld
or withdrawn under appropriate circumstances. 6
B. The Withholding or Withdrawal
of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
While the withholding or withdrawal of certain types of medical care now
takes place practically unquestioned,3 7 the removal of artificial nutrition and
hydration may disturb some individuals.38 Some view the termination of
nutrition and hydration, even if artificially provided, differently than the
termination of other medical procedures. Nevertheless, some medical situa-
tions demand that decisions regarding the provision of nutrition and hydra-
tion be made.39
1. The Methods and Risks of Providing
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
Patients receive artificial nutrition and hydration in various medical
contexts. Surgery may require this support for a short period of time. Long-
34. Bone, Rackow, Weg & members of the ACCP/SCCM Consensus Panel, Ethical and
Moral Guidelines for the Initiation, Continuation, and Withdrawal of Intensive Care, 97 CHmST
949, 953 (1990) [hereinafter ACCP/SCCM Panel].
35. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. App.
1988); In re Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
1988); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647;
In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
37. The removal of the mechanical ventilator from a dying patient no longer troubles most
doctors, lawyers, and ethicists. Carson, The Symbolic Significance of Giving to Eat and Drink,
in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS, supra note 3, at 84. The mechanical ventilator was once
called a "devilishly efficient instrument" by Paul Ramsey. P. RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON 81
(1970); see also Sprung, Changing Attitudes and Practices in Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treat-
ments, 263 J. A.M.A. 2211 (explaining that removal of life support is no longer seriously
questioned but including nutrition and hydration in care that may now be removed).
38. See generally Carson, supra note 37, at 84-88. When other types of support are used
in conjunction with artificial nutrition and hydration, the question of life support does not
usually focus on the provision of nutrition and hydration.
Some health care providers face the removal of nutrition and hydration with some trepidation.
Others will not remove this support at all. See Society of Critical Care Medicine Ethics Task
Force, Attitudes of Critical Care Professionals Concerning Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treat-
ments, 17 CRITICAL CARE MED. 589 (1989).
39. The ACCP/SCCM Panel included "parenteral and enteral fluids" and "parenteral and
enteral nutrition" in the list of "[ilntensive care therapies that are typically withheld or
withdrawn (based on disproportionate burden to patients)." ACCP/SCCM Panel, supra note
34, at 953.
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term requirements may result from some physical inability, including an
inability to swallow or to utilize nutrients, unconsciousness, or an aversion
to or lack of interest in eating. 4° Without the provision of artificial nutrition
and hydration to these patients, their chances of recovery could be severely
limited.
Health care personnel use a number of means to provide artificial nutrition
and hydration to patients. Common means of supplying the requirements
include nasogastric tubes, gastrostomy tubes, intravenous lines, and hyper-
alimentation. 41 Each of these methods carries with it some discomfort and
difficulties.4 2 A gastrostomy tube is surgically inserted though the abdominal
wall directly into the stomach. This tube may "obstruct the intestinal tract,
erode and pierce the stomach wall or cause leakage of the stomach's contents
into the abdominal cavity."' 43 Reflux of the stomach's contents into the lung
may lead to pneumonia and may also cause sores and infection.44 Nasogastric
tubes, which are inserted through the nose, throat, and esophagus to the
stomach, may cause discomfort, vomiting, irritation, bleeding, and ulcera-
tion.45 Dislodged or incorrectly placed tubes may lead to infection or even
death." Other problems include metabolic complications, fluid overload,
congestive heart failure, electrolyte imbalance, dehydration, and aspiration-
induced pneumonia. 47 Intravenous lines, which supply short-term nutrient
and fluid requirements directly into the veins, may cause irritated, infected,
or collapsed veins. 48 Finally, hyperalimentation requires surgery and follow-
up professional care. 49 While qualified health care professionals usually
deliver artificial nutrition and hydration effectively, discomfort and risks
accompany each of the procedures.
2. The Consequences of Withholding Nutrition and Hydration
Nonetheless, physicians and commentators debate over the amount of
pain that a patient experiences without the provision of nutrition and
hydration. Physicians notice that patients who are alert until death naturally
40. Major, The Medical Procedures for Providing Food and Water: Indications and Effects,
in By No ExmAORNARY MEANs, supra note 3, at 21.
41. Beatty, supra note 1, at 424.
42. See generally Lo & Dombrand, Guiding the Hand That Feeds, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED.
402 (1986).
43. Page, Andrassy & Sandier, Techniques in Delivery of Liquid Diets in Nutrition and
Clinical Surgery, in NUTRION IN CLImcAL SURGERY 66-67 (M. Dietel ed., 2d ed. 1985).
44. Bernard & Forlaw, Complications and Their Prevention in Enteral and Tube Feeding,
in CLImCAL NUTRmION 553 (1984); Beatty, supra note 1, at 425.
45. Beatty, supra note 1, at 425-26.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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reduce their intake and may even be puzzled by a lack of hunger or thirst.5 0
Those dying from dehydration may experience a "sedative effect on the
brain just before death."5 1 The discomfort varies among those who do feel
hunger and thirst, depending on the individual's particular medical circum-
stances.5 2 However, health care providers can control the amount of pain
or discomfort that may occur in the clinical setting, 3 and some argue that
this pain may be less than the pain that would occur with the administration
of food and water.5
4
3. Medical Approaches to Withholding
or Withdrawing Nutrition and Hydration
From a medical perspective, the withholding or withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration is permissible, but not required, if they are not
beneficial or if the burdens outweigh the benefits. 5 The American Medical
Association states: "Life-prolonging medical treatment includes ... artifi-
cially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration." '56 The
American Geriatrics Society, the American Academy of Neurology, and the
50. Lynn, supra note 3, at 2. See also Heyrnsfield, Bethel, Ansley, Nixon & Rudman,
Enteral Hyperalimentation: An Alternative to Central Venous Hyperalimentation, 90 ANArs
INTERNAL MED. 63 (1979) (describing the starvation process); Lynn & Childress, Must Patients
Always be Given Food and Water?, HAsTiNos CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 17, 19-20 (for those
unable to experience hunger or thirst, the removal will not result in more pain than the
termination of other medical treatments); Zerwekh, The Dehydration Question, NuRsING, Jan.
1983, at 47, 48 (describing the dehydration process).
Courts have also considered the question of whether patients experience pain when artificial
nutrition and hydration are not provided. E.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No.
85E0009-GI, slip op. at 29 (Mass. P. Ct., Oct. 21, 1985) (expressing concern about a patient's
ability to experience the pain); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (recognizing that
patients will not always experience pain).
51. American Dietetic A., Position of The American Dietetic Association: Issues in Feeding
the Terminally 11 Adult, 87 J. AM. Dmmz'c A. 81 (1987); Dresser & Boisaubin, Ethics, Law
& Nutrition Support, 145 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 122 (1985).
52. American Dietetic A., supra note 51, at 82; Dresser & Boisaubin, supra note 51; Young
& Scrimshaw, The Physiology of Starvation, 225 Sci. AM. 14 (1971). See generally Schmitz &
O'Brien, Observations on Nutrition and Hydration in Dying Cancer Patients, in By No
ExTRAoRwn ARY MEANs, supra note 3, at 29.
53. PRsmrN's COMM'N, supra note 30, at 19, 278-86; American Dietetic A., supra note
51, at 82 (explaining that the discomfort from dehydration may be relieved by ice chips and
glycerin swabbing); Saunders, Principles of Symptom Control in Terminal Care, 66 MAE.
CLN. N. AM. 1169 (1982); Watts & Cassel, Extraordinary Nutritional Support: A Case Study
and Ethical Analysis, 32 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'y 237, 241 (1984).
54. Zerwekh, supra note 50, at 51.
55. HAsTiNoS CENTER, GuiDELINEs ON THE TERNMNATION oF LnE-SusrAnnUNo TREAT mET
AND CARE OF THE DYING 59 (1987); Lynn & Childress, supra note 50; Watts & Cassel, supra
note 53, at 241.
56. American Med. A., supra note 8, § 2.18, at 12-13 ("It is not unethical to discontinue
all means of life-prolonging medical treatment," including artificial nutrition and hydration,
for patients in irreversible comas.).
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American Dietetic Association also express the opinion that the provision
of food and water may represent an elective procedure like others that
sustain life.57 The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research "found no particular
treatments-including such 'ordinary' hospital interventions as parenteral
nutrition or hydration, antibiotics, and transfusions-to be universally war-
ranted and thus obligatory for the patient to accept." 8 Many others see no
reason to treat food and water differently than other medical treatments.5 9
4. Opposing Voices: Basic Comfort Care and the Threat of Abuse
Micetich, Steinecker, and Thomasma note that "technology has far out-
paced our ability to alter the outcome of terminal diseases." 6 In some
cases, food and water may or may not offer comfort. These commentators
perceive the provision of intravenous fluids as a "therapy, analytically just
like any other therapy, including open heart surgery, kidney transplants,
cancer chemotherapy, and so on."' 61 However, several others have identified
reasons for believing that a difference exists between the removal of artificial
57. Executive Board, American Academy of Neurology, Position of the American Academy
of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative
State Patient, 39 NEURoLoGY 125-26 (1989); Ammu&cAN NURsES' A. ComM. ON ETIcs, GUIDE-
LNES ON WITnDRAWING OR Wr'HoLDimG FOOD AND FLUID (1985-87); American Dietetic A.,
supra note 51, at 78-85.
58. PREsmmrr's COMM'N, supra note 30, at 90.
59. Brock, Forgoing Life-Sustaining Food and Water: Is it Killing?, in By No ExTRAoR-
DINARY MEANs, supra note 3, at 117 ("[Florgoing food and water does not fall under any
special moral prohibition that would make it in itself morally different than the forgoing of
other life-sustaining medical care."); Lynn & Childress, supra note 50 ("There is no reason
to apply a different ethical standard to feeding and hydration."). See also Curran, Defining
Appropriate Medical Care: Providing Nutrients and Hydration for the Dying, 313 NEW ENO.
J. MED. 940, 940 (1985); Luce, Ethical Principles in Critical Care, 263 J. A.M.A. 698, 699
(1990) ("[W]ithholding and withdrawing of life support are entirely compatible with the ethical
principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and autonomy.... [Fluids and nutrition may be
withheld or withdrawn as properly as mechanical ventilation and other sophisticated thera-
pies."); Luce & Raffin, Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from Critically 11
Patients, 94 C=sr 621 (1984); Ruark, Raffin & Stanford U. Med. Center Comm. on Ethics,
Initiating and Withdrawing Life Support: Principles and Practice in Adult Medicine, 318 NEw
ENo. J. MED. 25 (1988); Steinbrook & Lo, Artificial Feeding-Solid Ground, Not a Slippery
Slope, 318 NEw ENO. J. MED. 286, 288 (1988) ("Artificial feedings can be viewed on a level
with other medical interventions.... It should not be considered a part of 'ordinary care' or
the routine provision of nursing care and comfort."). See generally Olins, Feeding Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 34 J. AM. GmATmIc Soc'y 313, 314 (1986) (citing sources that
support the withholding of nutrition and hydration if the patient rejects them).
60. Micetich, Steinecker & Thomasma, An Empirical Study of Physician Attitudes, in BY
No EXTRAORDINARY MEANs, supra note 3, at 39.
61. Id. ("[They] found it interesting that others perceived them differently."). For a study
on physicians' attitudes toward the use of intravenous fluids, see Micetich, Steinecker &
Thomasma, Are Intravenous Fluids Morally Required for a Dying Patient?, 143 ARCH.
INTEmAL Ma. 975 (1983).
19921
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
nutrition and hydration and other forms of care. 62 They argue that nutrition
and hydration serve as basic comfort care for all patients,63 and they equate
the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration with the traditional view
of meal times. 64
While the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration usually serves as
basic comfort care, it may burden patients. 65 Nevertheless, some commen-
tators have focused upon the symbolic meaning of food and water, arguing
that emotions attach to nourishment and feedings that attach to no other
type of medical support or treatment. Daniel Callahan once saw nourishment
as "the most fundamental of human relationships."" According to Carson,
"The simple act of offering to allay hunger and to slake the thirst of a
dying person is deemed, across time and cultures, to be not only right but
good."' 6 Recognition of the emotions that attach to food and water may
be important, but it should not control situations that have medical guide-
lines and options." The provision of artificial nutrition and hydration in a
medical setting does not deserve the same emotional response as daily
requirements received in traditional meals.69 The mealtime analogy does not
apply to the insertion of feeding and hydration tubes.
62. See generally Olins, supra note 59.
63. E.g., Anscombe, Ethical Problems in the Management of Severely Handicapped Chil-
dren: Commentary 2, 7 J. MED. ETUCS 117 (1981); Callahan, supra note 2. See generally
Childress, When Is It Morally Justifiable to Discontinue Medical Nutrition and Hydration, in
BY No ExTRAORmNARY MEANs, supra note 3, at 72.
A nurse alerted authorities after physicians Nejdi and Barber terminated intravenous nutrition
and hydration to a severely brain-damaged patiefit. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text for a description of Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006. The nurse, who
provided information that led to the physicians' indictment, asserted, "Food is an ordinary
means. And everyone has a right to ordinary treatment." Paris, Kaiser, Conroy, and the
Withdrawal of I.V. Feeding: Killing or Letting Die 1 (unpublished paper), cited in Childress,
supra, at 72.
64. See generally Walter, Food and Water: An Ethical Burden, 113 COMMONWEAL 616
(1986).
65. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
66. Callahan, supra note 2, at 22.
67. Carson, supra note 37, at 85 ("I1"o nourish is to nurse, in the inclusive sense of
harboring, as well as feeding. To offer food and water is to tend and to regard.").
68. Id. at 86 ("Such feelings ... should be taken seriously and should affect, but not
dictate, our actions in these matters."). See Landsman, Terminating Food and Water: Emerging
Legal Rules, in BY No EXTRAoRDNARY MEA s, supra note 3, at 144 ("To rely upon the
symbolism of a treatment in requiring it is to acknowledge that the welfare of the individual
being treated is irrelevant ... ."); Walter, supra note 64, at 616:
On one hand, our moral sensibilities seem minimally to require that we offer
food and water to those who are defenseless and in need of the basic nutritional
elements for physical existence. On the other hand, our heads inquire whether
the provision of such nutrition and water is not in the end useless or even
burdensome for the patient in [a persistent vegetative state].
69. Carson, supra note 37, at 87 ("Feeding is a reciprocal act. Its symbolic significance
resides in the mutuality of giving to eat and drink and of taking food and water.... In the
absence of this gesture of acceptance [the ability to ingest] the act of feeding is incomplete,
useless, arguably elective.").
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Even though most commentators support allowing patients to die by
removing medical treatment, some of them express reservations about re-
moving artificial nutrition and hydration from a dying patient. They may
find it difficult to distinguish between "killing" and "letting die" when
artificial nutrition and hydration are removed. 70
Several others conclude that removal should be avoided because of the
threat of abuse by health care providers. Daniel Callahan cautions, "[W]hat
if caregivers withhold food and water thoughtlessly, carelessly, and incor-
rectly, thereby causing much suffering and debasing a loyalty and duty to
a large number of seriously ill people?" ' 71 While this is a valid concern, the
medical profession holds its members to certain standards, regardless of the
type of treatment or support, and health care providers face civil or criminal
liability if they behave inappropriately. 72
Critics who rely on the symbolic significance of food and water alone
must be distinguished from critics who focus on the practical problems of
removal. Visions of a health care provider withholding a plate of food and
a glass of water from a patient obscure the reality that feeding and fluid
tubes may become a burden that both physicians and patients may wish to
terminate. Recognizing artificial nutrition and hydration as medical treat-
ments that patients may refuse along with artificial ventilators and other
life support is consistent with the realities of providing artificial nutrition
and hydration. 73 In addition, allowing patients to refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration fits into a deep tradition of support for personal autonomy.
Justice Cardozo, while on the New York Court of Appeals, stated: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
70. For a critique of the view that there is an absolute duty not to "kill" another, as
applied to incompetent dying patients, see Brock, supra note 33, at 855 (characterizing such
a duty as restrictive and interfering with a "position of common morality" that a competent
patient may refuse treatment).
71. Callahan, Public Policy and the Cessation of Nutrition, in BY No ExaToRiNARY
ME~s, supra note 3, at 64. ("[Iln our society we have a solid history of seeing things that
were initially introduced as possibilities for choice or discretion turned into matters of
mandatory behavior."). Callahan recognizes that the "reasonable argument" is that "on
certain occasions, we ought to be allowed to stop nutrition with some patients." Id. at 64.
72. One response to Callahan's concern about abuse in particular cases is to build in
safeguards. My interpretation of the Indiana Living Wills Act and Health Care Consent Law,
discussed infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text, should not concern him. In addition, the
Living Wills Act incorporates a number of safeguards, including requirements of a valid
execution of the document and of a "terminal condition" that will result in death within a
"short period of time." IND. CODE § 16-8-11-14 (1988). Likewise, the Health Care Consent
Law requires that surrogates' decisions not be contrary to patients' instructions and that the
physicians look to the patient's best interests, relying on appropriate medical standards. IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-3(b) and § 16-8-12-7(h) (Burns 1990). Immunity from civil and criminal
liability does not result unless providers adhere to the terms of the statutes. IND. CODE § 16-
8-11-14(d) and IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-9 (Bums 1990). See discussion infra note 171.
73. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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shall be done with his own body."7 4 Since this oft-quoted statement was
made, courts have recognized individuals' ability to make their own health
care decisions, including decisions about life support.75
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
Most courts recognize that the provision of artificial nutrition and hy-
dration may be no different than any other medical treatment.7 6 Following
the majority of state courts, the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health77 assumed that a competent individual has
a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and did not treat nutrition and
hydration differently.7 8 In addition, the Indiana Supreme Court recently
74. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
75. See infra notes 89-123 and accompanying text. There have been some recognized limits
on individuals' personal health care decisions. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(placing certain limits on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy); Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding a law requiring mandatory vaccinations when deemed
necessary for public health and safety). Likewise, the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment is not absolute. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 432-34, 497 N.E.2d at 634-35 (citing a number
of courts that have considered state interests in cases addressing the removal of life support).
In addition, many states have prohibitions against suicide. See Smith, All's Well That Ends
Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?,
22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 275, 291 n.106 (1989) (listing state statutes which make suicide a
crime).
76. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990);
Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586-87 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen ex rel.
Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (1987); Conservatorship of Drabick,
200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 195 n.9, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 846 n.9, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399
(1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (granting
competent individual's request for approval to remove nasogastric tube keeping her alive);
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So.
2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1200-01
(1990) (public guardian may be authorized to order the termination of artificial nutrition and
hydration even though no living will was executed); In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ili. 2d 33,
39-42, 549 N.E.2d 292, 295-96 (1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954 (Me. 1987); Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 435-39, 497 N.E.2d 626, 636-38 (1986); In re
Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 207-08, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964, review denied, 392 Mass. 1102,
465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 414 n.9, 529 A.2d 434, 444 n.9 (1987); In
re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 485-86, 517 A.2d 886, 891-92 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 213 N.J.
Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-74, 486 A.2d
1209, 1235-37 (1985); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 19, 516
N.Y.S.2d 677, 688-89 (App. Div. 1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 559-65, 747 P.2d
445, 452-55 (1987) (en banc) (noting that all courts addressing issue of artificial nutrition and
hydration have considered it the same as any other life-sustaining treatment).
77. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
78. Nancy Cruzan had been in a persistent vegetative state supported by the provision of
artificial nutrition and hydration since 1983. On Nancy Cruzan's behalf, her parents requested
that the provision be terminated. Id. at 2844-46. The Supreme Court of Missouri overturned
the lower court's ruling that there was clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's wishes
to terminate the nutrition and hydration. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416-17 (Mo.
1988). The Supreme Court, while recognizing that states could require clear and convincing
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explicitly recognized that artificial nutrition and hydration may be removed
under certain circumstances2 9
Despite judicial recognition of artificial nutrition and hydration as medical
treatments, several state legislatures have not followed suit. A number of
state statutes prohibit the enforcement of directives to remove artificial
nutrition and hydration. 0 Indiana seems unique in providing in its Living
Wills Act that "appropriate nutrition and hydration" are not "life-
prolonging procedures."'" Commentators usually include Indiana in the lists
of states that do not allow directives to authorize the removal of nutrition
and hydration. 2 However, careful consideration of the statute leads to the
conclusion that Indiana should not be characterized the same as those states
that never allow the removal of nutrition and hydration.
In the past few years, some states have considered changing living will
statutes to apply to artificial nutrition and hydration. 3 This discussion has
evidence, did not treat the case differently because of the factual element of nutrition and
hydration. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2841. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Cruzan,
explicitly expressed her view that "[a]rtificial feeding cannot be readily distinguished from
other forms of medical treatment." Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, the
constitutional right of an incompetent patient may not be resolved, since it was only assumed
by the Supreme Court. If the Court recognizes any constitutional right, this right would seem
to apply no differently to artificial nutrition and hydration.
After the Supreme Court's ruling, three of Nancy Cruzan's friends testified for the first
time during a county hearing on November 1, 1990 that Cruzan told them eight to twelve
years earlier that she did not want her life to be maintained by artificial means. The Missouri
judge determined that clear and convincing evidence had been presented that Cruzan would
not want to be provided with artificial nutrition and hydration. Tackett, Judge OKs Removing
Comatose Woman's Feeding Tube, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 15, 1990, at 1.
79. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39-41 (Ind. 1991).
80. See supra note 10.
81. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-4 (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 19 ("life-prolonging
procedure" defined).
82. See, e.g., A. MESEL, supra note 1; Beatty, supra note 1, at 431; Gelfand, Living Will
Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. Ray. 737, 750 n.49.
83. Washington's Initiative 119 not only included artificial nutrition and hydration in life-
support systems that could be removed, but also proposed to allow competent, terminally ill
adults to request assistance in dying. Euthanasia Initiative Goes to Legislature, The Seattle,
Jan. 30, 1991, at 12; Hammond, After Two Years of Torment, Death Won the Game, Seattle
Times, Sept. 7, 1990, at 9. Despite "broad agreement for the principle of doctor-assisted
suicide," Washington voters rejected Initiative 119. See J. Gross, The 1991 Election: Euthenasia;
Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16, col. 1. Voters may
have grown "squeamish and doubtful as they looked at the fine print of the legislation." Id.
Media coverage of the Cruzan case focused the public's attention on the issue of life support.
Even before the Supreme Court announced the Cruzan decision, there was extensive coverage
of that case and similar cases. See, e.g., Gibbs, Love and Let Die, Tnsn, Mar. 19, 1990, at
62 (featuring on the cover a stark photograph of Christine Busalacchi, who has been uncon-
scious since 1987, with her feeding tube exposed and her father looking on).
Since Cruzan, public opinion polls show that Americans favor the family's ability to terminate
life support. See, e.g., Wall St. J., July 13, 1990, at 1, col. 5. Cruzan also spurred action
among federal legislators. As of December 1, 1990, the federal health care "Miranda warning"
requirement affected hospitals, hospices, nursing homes, health maintenance organizations,
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not yet been successful in Indiana.Y However, the Indiana legislature recently
incorporated the new Power of Attorney Act provisions into the Health
Care Consent Law, making a health care representative's ability to make
decisions concerning artificial nutrition and hydration clearer. 8 The provi-
sions in the Power of Attorney Act include the provision of artificial
nutrition and hydration in the definition of medical treatment. s6 In addition,
the recent Lawrance decision, as well as the Cruzan decision, may encourage
the Indiana legislature to consider living will legislation that recognizes
artificial nutrition and hydration as medical procedures that may be legiti-
mately removed.
Before examining whether artificial nutrition and hydration may ever be
withheld or withdrawn under the Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Proce-
dures Act ("Living Wills Act"), consideration of whether they may be
removed apart from either the Living Wills Act or the Consent Law proves
helpful. Since case law supports the removal of artificial nutrition and
hydration even without a living will or the appointment of a health care
representative, the question of removal under the statutes becomes clearer.
In the recent In re Lawrance, the Indiana Supreme Court supported the
removal of artificial nutrition and hydration under the Consent Law.87 The
Lawrance decision should not come as any surprise. Many other state courts
that considered the question 8 helped predict the outcome of such a case in
Indiana. Indiana courts had not indicated that they would deal with the
question differently.
A. Cases Considering the Removal of Life Support
The first case to address the removal of life support, In re Quinlan 9
involved a young woman who suffered severe brain damage and entered a
and other health care facilities receiving funds from Medicare and Medicaid programs. Patients
must, upon admission, receive written information on life support options under state law,
including information on advance directives and health care durable powers of attorney. The
Patient Self Determination Act, §§ 4206 and 4751 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 (1990). See Sloane, '91 Law Says Failing Patients Must be Told
of Their Options, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1990, § I, at 50, col. 1; Law Will Require Right-to-
Die Advice, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 24, 1990, § 1, at 1. For a critique of this legislation, see
King, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The Patient Self-Determination Act, 19 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 80 (1991).
84. Recent attempts to revise the Living Wills Act were defeated. Indiana H.B. 1131 (1991).
The proposed bill would have changed the definition of "terminal condition," deleting the
phrase "within a short period of time" from "death will occur from the terminal condition
within a short period of time without the provision of life-prolonging procedures." Id. The
reference to the provision of "appropriate nutrition and hydration" in the definition of "life-
prolonging procedure" would have also been deleted.
85. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-13 (1988); see'also IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-5-16 to -17 (Burns
Supp. 1991); supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
86. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-2-4 (Burns Supp. 1991).
87. Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 38-41.
88. See supra note 76.
89. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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persistent vegetative state. Her father sought his appointment as guardian
with the authority to order the removal of the mechanical respirator that
supported Quinlan. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a right of
privacy grounded in the U.S. Constitution, which would allow the termi-
nation of treatment, but concluded that the right was not absolute. The
state's interest in "the preservation and sanctity of human life and defense
of the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to
his best judgment ... weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims;" in that
case the New Jersey court found the state's interest to be subordinate to
the patient's interest90 The court supported the family's determination of
whether the incompetent patient would exercise her right to refuse treatment
under the circumstances.9' However, the decision making was subject to
certain procedures designed to safeguard the process. 92
After Quinlan, courts concentrated on the common law right to refuse
treatment, although several courts also considered the constitutional privacy
right. 93 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewic 4 looked
to both a common law right to informed consent and to a constitutional
privacy right in a case involving the withdrawal of chemotherapy from a
sixty-seven-year-old retarded man with leukemia.95 The court concluded that
an incompetent individual retains the right to refuse treatment and adopted
a "substituted judgment" standard for determining the individual's wishes.96
90. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
91. Id. ("The only practical way to prevent destruction of [her right to privacy] is to
permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment, subject to the
qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she would exercise [her right] in these circum-
stances.").
92. The safeguards the court set forth were somewhat elaborate and allowed the physicians
and the hospital considerable discretion in the decision to withdraw life support:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the responsible
attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's
ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state
and that the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be
discontinued, they shall consult with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like
body of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that consultative
body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from
her present comatose condition . . ., the present life-support system may be
withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability ....
Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
93. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847; see also L. TRIBE, AmsRmcA CoNsTrIoNAL LAW § 15-
11 (2d ed. 1988).
94. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
95. Id.
96. Id. The "substituted judgment" standard attempts "to determine with as much accuracy
as possible the wants and needs of the individual involved" in order to decide what the person
would have decided if he had been competent. Id. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430. For a review
of the historical development of the substituted judgment standard, see id. at 431.
The court in In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981),
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The court recognized the state's interests in the question, noting that interest
in the preservation of life was the most important of those discussed,
especially when an affliction was curable.97
The first reported case to consider the specific question of the removal
of artificial nutrition and hydration did so in the criminal context. In Barber
v. Superior Court,98 two physicians terminated the provision of intravenous
fluids to a patient who had suffered severe brain injury during surgery.9
The magistrate dismissed murder charges against them at the end of the
preliminary hearing, concluding that the removal was not "killing."' ' 0 After
the trial court ordered the complaint be reinstated, the appellate court
reversed. The appellate court determined that the evidence supported the
dismissal of the complaint since the removal was not an affirmative act or
an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty given the patient's chances of
recovery and the family's wishes.10' The court stated, "[W]e view the use
of an intravenous administration of nourishment and fluid, under the
circumstances, as being the same as the use of the respirator or other form
of life support equipment."' 2
Since Barber, courts have allowed the withholding or withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration as long as particular safeguards are fol-
lowed. 03 The same court that decided In re Quinlan'04 addressed artificial
nutrition and hydration in In re Conroy.05 The New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized the "emotional significance" of food but noted that feeding by
implanted tubes is a "medical procedur[e] with inherent risks and possible
side effects, instituted by skilled health-care providers to compensate for
impaired physical functioning."'' 06 The court determined that "artificial
looking only to the common law informed consent doctrine, turned to a "best interests"
approach for a patient who had been incompetent for most of his life. The "best interests"
approach looks not to what the patient would have decided, but to what decision would be
best for the patient. Since Storar had never been competent, the court concluded that "it
[was] unrealistic to attempt to determine whether he would want to continue potentially life
prolonging treatment if he were competent." Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 71.
97. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741-42, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
98. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
99. Id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86. The patient's immediate family supported the
removal of the intravenous fluids. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
100. Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
101. Id. at 1016-21, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489-93.
102. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
103. See, e.g., supra note 92.
104. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
105. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (The court concentrated on a common law right of self-
determination.).
106. Id. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236. The court asserted that "the right to self-determination
ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests, and competent persons generally are
permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of death." Id. at 353, 486 A.2d at
1225. The court continued, "Most of the cases that have held otherwise, unless they involved
the interest in protecting innocent third parties, have concerned the patient's competency to
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feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or intravenous infusion can be seen
as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a respirator." 10 7
Following Conroy, in In re Jobes,0 the same court allowed the removal
of nutrition and hydration according to certain safeguards, explaining that
"the right of a patient in an irreversibly vegetative state ... may be
exercised by the patient's family or close friend."' 1 9 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts supported the application of the substituted judgment stan-
dard to the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration in Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital."0 In Bouvia v. Superior Court,"' the California
Court of Appeal honored the request of a competent twenty-eight-year-old
quadriplegic that the nasogastric tube that supported her be removed." 2
Corbett v. D'Alessandrol" permitted the cessation of artificial nutrition and
hydration, finding "no reason to differentiate between the multitude of
artificial devices that may be available to prolong the moment of death.""14
Finally, the more recent case of In re Estate of Greenspan"5 allowed the
discontinuance of artificial nutrition and hydration by a public guardian." 6
These courts have progressively developed an incompetent individual's
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition and
hydration. The United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,17 stated, "[Flor the purposes of this case, we assume
that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutri-
tion.""' 8 It considered the state's interests-the preservation of life, the
safeguarding of the "personal element of this choice," and the reluctance
to make "quality" of life determinations." 19 The Court stated, "In our
view, Missouri has permissibly sought to advance these interests through
make a rational and considered choice of treatment." Id. at 353-54, 486 A.2d at 1225. The
court then concluded that an incompetent individual's right to refuse treatment may be exercised
by a surrogate decision maker. Id. at 361-68, 486 A.2d at 1229-33.
107. Id. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236.
108. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
109. Id. at 420, 529 A.2d at 447.
110. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626.
111. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297.
112. Id.
113. 487 So. 2d 368.
114. Id. at 371.
115. 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (removal allowed despite the fact that the patient
executed neither a living will nor appointed a surrogate decision maker).
116. Id.
117. 110 S. Ct. 2841. See generally Annas, The Long Dying of Nancy Cruzan, 19 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 52 (1991) (critiquing the Cruzan decision); Bopp & Marzen, supra note
11 (examining the decision and its implications).
118. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852. Justice O'Connor noted: "Accordingly, the liberty guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply
personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water." Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2852-53.
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the adoption of a 'clear and convincing' standard of proof to govern such
proceedings."' 20 The Supreme Court's holding was narrow-merely that a
state could require clear and convincing evidence as a "procedural safe-
guard.' ' 2' However, the Court did recognize that it was "not faced in this
case with the question of whether a State might be required to defer to the
decision of a surrogate if competent and probative evidence had established
that the patient herself had expressed a desire that the decision to terminate
life-sustaining treatment be made for her by that individual."' 22
While it is uncertain how far the Supreme Court would extend an
incompetent patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the Court did
affirm important principles of health care decision making, as well as
address the question of artificial nutrition and hydration. While the deter-
mination of the burden of proof remains a matter for the states to govern,
the Court, at a minimum, assumed that the right to refuse treatment exists. 123
B. Indiana's Approach to Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
The courts' progressive development of an individual's right to refuse
treatment puts the recent In re Lawrance decision in its proper context.
Indiana case law, as well, paved the way for the Indiana Supreme Court's
approach to nutrition and hydration in Lawrance.
A recent Indiana medical malpractice case, Payne v. Marion General
Hospital,'2 charged a physician with negligence for not consulting the patient
before entering a "no code" order'2 on the patient's chart. The case
focused on whether the patient'2 6 was competent enough for the physician
to have consulted him about the order.127 A few hours after the order,
120. Id. at 2853.
121. Id. at 2852.
122. Id. at 2856 n.12. Justice O'Connor noted:
I also write separately to emphasize that the Court does not today decide the
issue whether a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate
decisionmaker.... In my view, such a duty may well be constitutionally required
to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.
Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2852.
124. 549 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The appellate court dealt with an appeal from
a grant of a summary judgment motion in favor of the defendants.
125. A "no code" order, which may also be referred to as a "do-not-resuscitate" order or
a "no code blue" order, is a designation in a patient's chart that no cardiopulmonary
resuscitation is to be given in case of cardiopulmonary arrest. See Mooney, Deciding Not to
Resuscitate Hospital Patients: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 1986 U. ILL. L. Ray. 1025,
1025-26.
126. Payne was a 65-year-old alcoholic who suffered from malnutrition, uremia, hyperten-
sion, cardiovascular disease, chronic obstructive lung disease, and other medical problems.
Payne, 549 N.E.2d at 1044.
127. The physician consulted with the patient's sister, who supported the entry of the order
after she observed Payne's worsening condition. Id.
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Payne died; no cardiopulmonary resuscitation was attempted. The appellate
court noted that no court had considered a physician's liability for entering
a "no code" order and then directed its attention to cases in various
jurisdictions that had dealt with the removal of life support.Iu The court
stated that "[t]he patient's right of self-determination is the sine qua non
of the physician's duty to obtain informed consent."129 The court then
examined testimony on the patient's competency presented at the trial,
concluding that "genuine issue[s] of fact" existed that required a reversal
of the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant physician
and the practice group. 130 Payne thus illustrated Indiana's support for a
patient's right of self-determination, even though the case did not deal with
Indiana statutory law.
Recognizing that artificial nutrition and hydration may be removed with-
out a living will or without the appointment of a surrogate decision maker
goes a long way toward answering the question of whether they may be
removed under the Indiana Living Wills Act and the Health Care Consent
Law. Put simply, it is unreasonable to conclude that what can be done
without a living will cannot be done with it. Given the language of the two
Indiana statutes and the policy considerations that underlie them,' the
logical conclusion is that artificial nutrition and hydration may be removed
with or without living wills or health care appointments.
While specifically considering the Indiana Health Care Consent Law, the
Indiana Supreme Court, in the case of In re Lawrance, examined Indiana
constitutional law, Indiana common law, persuasive authority from other
states, and the view of the medical community in reaching its decision. The
court addressed the question of "whether the parents of a patient in a
persistent vegetative state [could] authorize the withdrawal of artificially
provided nutrition and hydration from their never-competent daughter."'3 2
Sue Ann Lawrance, the patient, was described by the Indiana Supreme
Court as a "forty-two-year-old woman who was 'completely nonverbal,
nonambulatory, requir[ing] total care and ... only sustained by artificially
delivered nutrition and hydration."" 3 Lawrance died in the course of the
appeal, but the supreme court determined that the case fell into a public
interest exception to the mootness principle.'3 The court noted:
128. Id. at 1045.
129. Id. at 1046. The court quoted Justice (then Judge) Cardozo: 'Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has the right to determine what shall be done with his own body
...."' Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914)).
130. Id. at 1050. The appellate court did not reverse the grant of summary judgment motion
as to the hospital. Id. at 1051.
131. See infra discussion at notes 147-63 and accompanying text.
132. Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 34.
133. Id. (citing Amended Order on Petition for Authority at 3).
134. Id. at 37.
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The public interest at stake is demonstrated in part by the great number
of high quality amicus briefs submitted to this Court. These briefs
suggest that, irrespective of the death of the patient in this litigation,
many Indiana citizens, health care professionals, and health care insti-
tutions expect to face the same legal questions in the future. 35
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended the
Consent Law to be a "procedural statute."' 136 The court stated that "the
act [was] designed to establish procedures for health care decision making
without altering the substantive right of patients and their families.' 3 7 The
court then turned to the substantive law of Indiana, explaining that "Indiana
common law and statutory law both describe an environment in which
patient decision making is a central tenet.' 1
38
While the Indiana Supreme Court did not consider the United States
Constitution, the court noted that the "common law [had] evolved in a
legal culture governed by the Indiana Constitution, which begins by declaring
that the liberty of our citizens is inalienable."' 3 9 According to the court,
"[the debates of our constitutional convention suggest that those who wrote
the constitution believed that liberty included the opportunity to manage
one's own life except in those areas yielded up to the body politic."'14 The
supreme court then turned to provisions of the Indiana Living Wills Act,
the new Powers of Attorney Act, and the Health Care Consent Law to
support its statement that "Indiana's statutes reflect a commitment to patient
self-determination."141
Finding a "substantive right of a patient or her representative to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment," the court concluded that "the adminis-
tration of artificial nutrition and hydration ... is medical treatment which
can be refused." 142 This determination was supported by "the view of the
Indiana medical community; Indiana statutory law, including the [Consent
Law]; and persuasive authority from numerous courts across the country.' 1 43
135. Id.
136. Id. at 38. The court supported this conclusion by turning to the use of the word
"affect" in Indiana Code section 16-8-12-11(a) and to the uniform act upon which the Consent
Law was based. Id. See MODEL HEILT-CARE CONSENT AcT Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 453
(1988).
137. Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 38.
138. Id. The court cited Revord v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), for
the principle that the doctrine of informed consent "recognizes the right of the patient 'to
intelligently reject or accept treatment."' Id. at 38-39. The court then cited Payne, 549 N.E.2d
1043.
139. Id. at 39 (looking to IND. CoNsT. art. I, § 1).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The court cited the Indiana State Medical Association statement of the American
Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs' opinion. Id. at 39-40. The court
then stated that "[tihe very broad scope which the legislature gave the [Consent Law] also
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The supreme court determined that the Consent Law was "designed to
resolve health care decisions without a need for court proceedings."' 44 The
court also concluded that the lower court erred in appointing a temporary
limited guardian for Lawrance under Indiana Code § 29-3-3-4,145 since her
family appeared to have the authority to act in the circumstances. 46
In re Lawrance has broad scope regarding both the ability to refuse life-
sustaining treatment and artificial nutrition and hydration in general. Given
the scope of Lawrance, the approach of Indiana's Living Wills and Life
Prolonging Procedures Act seems particularly restrictive regarding artificial
nutrition and hydration.
C. Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act
One approach to the Living Wills Act assumes that the Act does not
grant any right which patients did not previously have. 47 This is clearly
supported by case law from other jurisdictions1" and may be inferred from
Payne v. Marion General Hospital'49 and from In re Lawrance.1 50 Indiana
Code § 16-8-11-1 outlines Indiana's policy: "Competent adults have the
right to control the decisions relating to their own medical care, including
persuades us that its procedure may be applied to decisions concerning artificial nutrition and
hydration." Id. at 40. Finally, the supreme court noted that its conclusion was "consistent
with the apparently widespread view of courts that 'there is no objective distinction between
withdrawal or withholding or artificial feeding and medical treatment."' Id. (citing In re Peter,
108 N.J. 365, 382, 529 A.2d 419, 428 (1987)).
144. Id. at 41-43 (concluding that future declaratory proceedings under Indiana Code section
16-8-12-4 would be inappropriate).
145. See IND. CODE § 29-3-3-4 (West Supp. 1990) (setting forth the requirements that must
be met before a court can make an appointment of a guardian).
146. Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 43-44.
147. Mooney, Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act: A Reform Pro-
posal, 20 IND. L. REv. 539 (1987) (The law "articulates" rather than "grants" the right of
an adult to execute a document with health care directives "because it is arguable that such
a right exists even without legislation."). See also Paris & McCormick, Living-Will Legislation
Reconsidered, AimERcA, Sept. 5, 1981 at 86, 87.
At least one other commentator on living wills in general has reached this same conclusion.
The living will affirms the central value of the individual patient as both the
subject-object and ultimate arbiter of his or her treatment decisions.... The
living will may allow to be done what ought to be done by providing the comfort
of written documentation of the patients' desires at a time when they can no
longer speak for themselves.
Johnson, Sequential Domination, Autonomy and Living Wills, 9 W. NEw ENG. L. Ray. 113,
116 (1987) (emphasis in original). See also In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (While the
incompetent woman's living will did not go into effect, because she was not terminally ill, the
removal of feeding tubes was authorized based on her "fundamental right of self-determina-
tion.").
148. See supra note 76 for a listing of such cases.
149. 549 N.E.2d 1043. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Payne.
150. Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 38 (characterizing the Health Care Consent Law as a
"procedural statute").
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the decisions to have medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to
prolong their lives provided, withheld, or withdrawn." The statute allows
an individual to execute a "living will" indicating a desire not to have life-
prolonging procedures provided in the event of incompetency and a terminal
illness from which death will occur within a short period of time.'5 ' The
definition of a "life-prolonging procedure" explicitly excludes the provision
of "appropriate nutrition and hydration, the administration of medication,
or the performance of any medical procedure necessary to provide comfort
care or alleviate pain.' ' 52
D. The Indiana Health Care Consent Law
The Indiana Health Care Consent Law ("Consent Law")'53 allows a
representative to make health care decisions for an incompetent patient.
The law defines "health care" as "any care, treatment, service, or procedure
to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental condi-
tion."' 5 4 The Consent Law then states that "[a]n individual otherwise
authorized under th[e] chapter may consent to health care unless, in the
good faith opinion of the attending physician, the individual is incapable
of making a decision regarding the proposed health care'1 5- or if the patient
left contrary instructions. 56 Those "otherwise authorized" include those
individuals appointed in a writing under section 16-8-12-6 or by a family
member or guardian under section 16-8-12-4.51 Like the Living Wills Act,
151. In the alternative, an individual may execute a "life-prolonging procedure declaration,"
which requests the provision of all life-prolonging procedures under the same circumstance.
IND. CODE § 16-8-11-12 (1988).
One purpose of the Living Will Act is to free physicians from liability if they follow the
terms of the Act. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-14(c)-(d) (1988). The Act requires that the declarant
be at least eighteen years of age, that the declaration be in writing, and that it be witnessed
by two individuals. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-11 (1990 Supp.). The witnesses may not be a parent,
spouse or child of the declarant, anyone entitled to any part of the declarant's estate nor
anyone directly responsible for the declarant's medical care. Id. The physician must certify in
writing that the patient is a "qualified" patient under the Act-that is, that the patient has a
terminal condition and that death will occur from the terminal condition whether or not life-
prolonging procedures are used. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-14 (1988). A living wills declaration is
not binding upon the physician, IND. CODE § 16-8-11-11(f), although there is an obligation to
transfer the patient to another physician who will follow the declaration's terms if it is
determined that the patient is "qualified," IND. CODE § 16-8-11-14(e)-(f).
152. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-4.
153. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-12-1 to -13 (Burns 1990 & 1991 Supp.).
154. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-1(2).
155. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-3(a).
156. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-3(6). This part of the statute supports the conclusion that
the substituted judgment standard should be implemented when there is sufficient evidence.
However, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-6(h)(1) suggests that the best interest approach should
be used.
157. Family members listed are spouses, parents, adult children, or adult siblings. IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-12-4(2). A religious superior may also make health care decisions if no one else
is available. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4(3).
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the Health Care Consent Law offers health care providers exemption from
liability if they follow the Consent Law in good faith.'
If the statute said nothing more, no question would arise whether a health
care representative or family member could authorize the withholding or
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Artificial nutrition and
hydration would be "care" used "to maintain" the patient's "physical...
condition." 15 9 However, the chapter notes that it, "does not affect Indiana
law concerning an individual's authorization to make a health care decision
for an individual or another individual, or to provide, withdraw, or withhold
medical care necessary to prolong or sustain life." 16° Based on this provision,
some have suggested that the Consent Law was never intended for anything
but routine health care decisions.1 6 In re Lawrance'62 rejects this conclusion.
In addition, the newly enacted Power of Attorney Act that is incorporated
into the Consent Law includes the provision of artificial nutrition and
hydration in its definition of "health care." 163
III. CONCLUSIONS BASED UPON POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE ACTS
A. Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act:
What is "Appropriate Nutrition and Hydration?"
No significant legislative history exists concerning the passage of the
Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act ("Living Wills
Act"). However, the Living Wills Act did not go unnoticed by the media.
158. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-9.
159. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-1.
160. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-11(a). See Thompson, Indiana Health Care Consent Law:
A Guiding Light for the Health Care Providers, 21 IND. L. REv. 181, 199-200 (1988) (reaching
the conclusion that the Health Care Consent Law was not intended to alter the Living Wills
Act).
161. E.g., Thompson, supra note 160, at 199-200; see Brief of Indiana State Representatives
Donald T. Nelson and Jesse Villapando as Anici Curiae at 4, Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 32
(arguing that the Consent Law was "not intended to apply to cases involving life-sustaining
nutrition and hydration"). Those who argue that the Consent Law was not intended to alter
existing substantive Indiana law turn to the Model Act upon which Indiana's law was derived.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-11(a) and MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENr ACT § 11, 9 U.L.A.
at 470. The comment to section 11 of the Model Act states:
This Act is narrow in scope. It is not concerned with the narrow standard of
care required of health-care providers. It is not concerned with whether, how
and under what circumstances consent to health care is required. Nor is it an
informed consent statute. As outlined in the Prefatory Note, this statute is
basically a procedural one and matters of state substantive law are unchanged.
MODEL HEAL.TH-CARE CONSENT ACT § 11 comment, 9 U.L.A. at 472.
162. 579 N.E.2d 32.
163. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-2-4.
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"Conservative groups ... blocked passage of the bill for years" because
they felt it "condoned suicide and euthanasia.'" 1  Before and after its
passage, newspaper articles noted that the Act did not apply to nutrition
and hydration 65 After the Act's passage, one of its sponsors "asserted that
the living will [was] not intended to justify denial of food, liquid or pain
relievers."'"1 Then, when the Indiana legislature faced an opportunity to
delete the "appropriate nutrition and hydration" language, it rejected the
opportunity. 167
Despite the fact that the legislature rejected the suggested revisions of the
Living Wills Act, examination of the statutory language reveals that such a
change is unnecessary. Although many legislators may not have questioned
the inclusion of the word "appropriate," statutory construction rules sup-
port the consideration of all included words under the premise that each
word must have been included for a reason. 1 In this case, attributing
meaning to the word "appropriate" is consistent with medical consensus
on the withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, as
well as with policies of self-determination and autonomy in health care
decision making. 6 9
Two possible interpretations of the word "appropriate" exist. One pos-
sible, although not plausible, approach assumes that all nutrition and
hydration are appropriate and thus not subject to removal under the Living
Wills Act. However, this interpretation would be tantamount to saying that
the word "appropriate" has no real meaning. The legislature could have
deleted the word, and the same meaning would remain.
164. Headden, 'Living Wills' Relieve Kin of Making Hard Choices, Lawyers Told, Indiana-
polis Star, Nov. 9, 1985, at 33, col. 1.
165. See, e.g., Senate Passes 'Living Will' Measure, Indianapolis Star, Mar. 28, 1985, at
17, col. 1.
166. Heidden, supra note 164 (offering state senator William Vobach's conclusion). The
fact that certain legislators attribute a particular meaning to language in the statute is not
conclusory, for each legislator could offer different conclusions. Therefore, it is difficult to
determine the intent of the legislature as a body.
167. Ind. H.B. 1131, 107th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. This bill would have removed the
"appropriate nutrition and hydration" language from Indiana Code § 16-8-11-4(b). It also
would have added language to Indiana Code § 16-8-11-12 allowing a person to explicitly
request that "artificially supplied nutrition and hydration" be withheld. The bill passed in the
Senate, but the conference committee report was defeated in the House.
168. See, e.g., R. DIcKERsoN, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION oF STATUTES 38-39,
198, 200-01, 205, 213, 230 (1975). Professor Dickerson noted: "mhe only basis for applying
a statute more restrictively than what a literal reading of the statutory language allows is
through inferences of fact, based on a reading of the statutory language in light of its proper
context." Id. at 200. See also In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 38-40 (Ind. 1991); F. McCAsrnRY,
STATuToRY CoNsTRucTioN 3-7 (1953). "In general, the doctrine of literalness demands that
plain, unambiguous statutory language, expressing a single, sensible meaning, be interpreted
to mean exactly what it says." Id. at 7. But see R. DicKnaSoN, supra, at 227-36, 233 (1975)
(where the author supports a "plain meaning 'presumption' rather than a "plain meaning
'rule"').
169. See supra notes 50-59, 73-75 and accompanying text.
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A second option reads the inclusion of the word "appropriate" as
indicating that providing artificial nutrition and hydration may sometimes
be inappropriate. 7 0 The determination of the appropriateness would neces-
sarily be the responsibility of health care providers in particular cases.17 1
This option recognizes the symbolic meaning of food and water in the
traditional context, because oral nutrition and hydration would always be
appropriate; only the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration would
be treated as a medical procedure that may be withheld or withdrawn. 72
This approach is consistent with the views of much of the medical com-
munity and considers the concerns of those who oppose the removal of
nutrition and hydration because of their symbolic nature. 7 1
Legislators may not have intended any nutrition and hydration to be
considered inappropriate and subject to removal. However, there is no way
to verify this interpretation. 7 4 Statutory interpretation encourages consid-
eration of all words unless valid reasons exist for not doing so.175 Given
170. One court even reached this conclusion without the presence of the word "appropriate."
In McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989),
the court construed the Connecticut Removal of Life Support System Act to authorize the
removal of gastrostomy tubes, even though nutrition and hydration were excluded from the
list of "life support systems" that could be withdrawn.
171. One could conclude that the word "appropriate" invites involvement of the courts.
However, health care providers should be able to make these decisions. Safeguards that have
been built into the Living Wills Act ensure that the decisions are properly made. The statute
grants health care providers immunity from civil and criminal liability "for failure to provide
medical treatment to a patient who has refused the treatment in accordance with this section."
IND. CODE § 16-8-11-10(c) (1988). "In accordance with this section" indicates that the patient
is "qualified"; that is, that the patient has a "terminal condition ... from which, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty ... there can be no recovery ... and death will occur
from the terminal condition within ... a short period of time without the provision of life-
prolonging procedures." IND. CODE § 16-8-11-9 (1988). The declaration must also be validly
executed under the Act. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-11 (1990 Supp.).
The legislature obviously expects physicians to comply with medical standards in determining
whether the "terminal condition" requirement has been met. Likewise, a determination of
whether artificial nutrition and hydration are inappropriate, and thus a "life-prolonging
procedure," should be made by health care providers. If the requirements of the statutes are
met, immunity from liability would follow.
These safeguards also appear in the Health Care Consent Law. There, procedures of
appointments must be met, and if sufficient evidence of the patient's wishes is unavailable,
the best interests of the patient are considered, looking to appropriate medical standards. IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4 and § 16-8-12-6(h) (Bums 1990). See Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 42-43
(discussing controls on the decision-making process).
172. The fact that the statute does not distinguish between "artificial" and oral feedings
supports this interpretation of the word "appropriate." The Living Wills Act only speaks of
"appropriate nutrition and hydration," not "appropriate artificial nutrition and hydration."
IND. CODE § 16-8-11-4 (1988).
173. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 166.
175. See supra note 168. The Indiana Supreme Court stated in Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at
38: "We examine a statute as a whole, giving common and ordinary meaning to the words
used." Id. (citation omitted).
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
medical and judicial consensus, as well as policy reasons already discussed,
the term "appropriate" should be read to allow health care providers
flexibility. While not all physicians are comfortable with the removal of
nutrition and hydration, the statute addresses this potential problem, because
living will declarations are not binding upon physicians. 76
B. The Health Care Consent Law: If Artificial Nutrition and
Hydration Cannot Be Removed Under the Living Will Act, May a
Health Care Representative Nevertheless Direct Their Removal?
The same representatives who sponsored the Indiana Living Wills and
Life-Prolonging Procedures Act in 1985 presented the Indiana Health Care
Consent Law177 that went into effect in 1987. However, unlike the Living
Wills Act, the passage of the Consent Law was not controversial. 78
The Health Care Consent Law addresses health care decision making for
incompetent patients from a different perspective than the Living Wills Act.
The Consent Law provides for other individuals to make decisions for an
incompetent patient. 79 A competent patient may appoint a "health care
representative" and may include specific instructions for that representative
to follow.8 0 If no representative was appointed to-make the decision (either
by the individual herself or by the coirts), the Consent Law allows the
health care provider to turn to family members with no order of preference
identified. 8 1 Unlike the Living Wills Act, the Consent Law does not require
that the patient be terminally ill for the Consent Law to apply.8 2
The Consent Law, of course, deals with "health care." It defines "health
care" as "any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose,
or treat an individual's physical or mental condition.' 83 While one approach
to the Consent Law concludes that it was never intended to deal with the
removal of health care, especially care as controversial as artificial nutrition
176. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-11(f).
177. IND. CODE Ar. §§ 16-8-12-1 to -13 (Burns 1990 & 1991 Supp.).
178. A search of and by The Indianapolis Star and The Indianapolis News concerning the
bill at the time it would have been discussed and was passed uncovered no articles.
179. The Consent Law is not entirely clear about which approach a surrogate decision maker
should take to make decisions. On one hand, the statute states decisions should be consistent
with instructions left by the incompetent patient. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-3(b). On the other
hand, the statute explicitly states that decisions must be made in the best interests of the
patient. IND. CODE AN. § 16-8-12-6(h).
180. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-6(d).
181. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4.
182. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-3(a).
183. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-1(2).
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and hydration,1ss this conclusion is not supported by the In re Lawrance
decision or the new Power of Attorney Act that supplements the Consent
Law. However, reading the Health Care Consent Law as allowing the
removal of nutrition and hydration conflicts with the Living Wills Act
provisions. If nutrition and hydration may never be removed under the
Living Wills Act, they could nevertheless be removed under the Health Care
Consent Law.
The apparent policy of the Health Care Consent Law allows health care
decision making that complies with an incompetent patient's wishes when
those wishes are known.' The Consent Law supports surrogates standing
in the shoes of patients to make necessary health care decisions, even when
the decisions involve artificial nutrition and hydration. The explicit language
184. See Thompson, supra note 160, at 182 ("The [Health Care Consent Law] purportedly
is not designed to provide answers for the extraordinary cases, such as treatment of terminal
illness, organ donation, or the treatment of mental illness; however, such situations as
withdrawal of or withholding life-supportive measures may fall within the Act's coverage.").
Support for the conclusion that the Consent Law was not intended to deal with the withdrawal
of artificial nutrition and hydration and other life support was found within the statute itself:
"This chapter does not affect Indiana law concerning an individual's authorization to make a
health care decision for the individual or another individual, or to provide, withhold, or
withdraw medical care necessary to prolong or sustain life." IrD. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-11(a).
If the law did not affect "an individual's authorization to make a ... decision for the
individual," this could have simply meant that the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration,
if not allowed under the Living Wills Act, will not be allowed under the Indiana Health Care
Consent Law. One commentator explains:
[T]he Health Care Consent Act was not intended to affect Indiana's Living Wills
and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act. However, when considering the two Acts
separately, there is a clear legislative pronouncement that, on the one hand, a
competent adult diagnosed as having a terminal condition may give valid consent
to the withdrawal or prolongation of life-supporting procedures through a dec-
laration prior to becoming incapacitated. On the other hand, the same individual
has the right to appoint another person to make health care decisions on his
behalf in the event of his incapacity. Given the legislative intent of these two
Acts, the question arises whether an individual authorized to exercise consent
under the Health Care Consent Act may consent to the withdrawal or withholding
of life-supporting measures on behalf of a terminally ill patient.
Thompson, supra note 160, at 199 (citations omitted). However, even assuming the Living
Wills Act never includes artificial nutrition and hydration as a "life-prolonging procedure,"
common law and constitutional principles remain a part of "Indiana law." As noted earlier,
Indiana courts support the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration even without an
appointed surrogate decisionmaker or a living will. See discussion supra notes 124-46 and
accompanying text. Likewise, the fact that the chapter does not affect an individual's ability
"to provide, withdraw, or withhold medical care necessary to prolong or sustain life" does
not indicate that the chapter prohibits such removal by a surrogate; it only says that prior
"Indiana law" stands. However, since one purpose of the Health Care Consent Law is to
offer health care providers freedom from criminal and civil liability if they follow the terms
of the statute,. IND. CODE § 16-8-12-9, this freedom from liability may not occur if the provider
would rely on her understanding of common law principles alone.
185. See Thompson, supra note 160, at 199 ("Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging
Procedures Act, and now the Health Care Consent Act, are manifestations of the increasingly
strong affirmation that an individual should have substantial control over his medical care.")
(citations omitted).
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of the power of attorney provisions incorporated into the Consent Law
supports this conclusion.
C. Interaction of the Living Will and Life-Prolonging Procedures
Act and the Health Care Consent Law
A number of possible interpretations of the Indiana Living Wills and
Life-Prolonging Procedures Declaration Act and the Health Care Consent
Law emerge. The best interpretation of the Living Wills Act is that artificial
nutrition and hydration may be inappropriate; if they are inappropriate,
their provision may be considered a "life-prolonging procedure" that may
be withheld or withdrawn under the Act. Since the Consent Law includes
artificial means of providing nutrition and hydration in its newly incorpo-
rated definition of "health care," any question of removal of artificial
nutrition and hydration by a health care representative should be resolved
by the statute. 18 6
Avoiding the conclusions I have suggested yields inconsistent and illogical
interpretations of these statutes. Imagine, for instance, that an individual
has executed a living wills declaration expressing a desire not to receive
inappropriate nutrition and hydration. 1 7 If artificial nutrition and hydration
never represent "life-prolonging procedures" under the Living Wills Act,
then the support may not be removed under the Act. However, common
law principles may allow such a declaration as evidence of the patient's
wishes so that the nutrition and hydration may be removed anyway. Like-
wise, if the Health Care Consent Law is not related to the Indiana Living
Wills Act, in some situations a surrogate may be able to authorize what
the individual herself could not.
186. The question could be raised whether artificial nutrition and hydration provided by
means not listed in the statute may be removed. However, this overly technical reading of the
Power of Attorney Act should be avoided. The policies behind the Consent Law support a
reading consistent with its underlying policies.
187. For example, one commentator has noted that an individual's living will actually
contains this language:
Without affecting or limiting the generality of the foregoing, I specifically do
not wish to have administered to me in the event of terminal condition treatments
such as surgeries, dialysis, chemotherapies, radiations, pacemakers or blood
transfusions, and I further do not want electrical or mechanical resuscitation of
my heart when it has stopped beating, nasogastric tube feedings when I am
paralyzed and unable to swallow and mechanical respiration when my brain can
no longer sustain my own breathing.
Nocon, Indiana's Living Will After. Cruzan, 83 IND. Ma. 832, 833 (1990). The interpretation
of the Living Wills Act that I have suggested would give meaning to the above living will's
reference to nasogastric tube feedings. However, use of language that strays from the form
suggested in the statute would arguably not be "substantially in the form set forth" in the
Act. See IND. CODE § 16-8-11-12 (1988). While I include this warning, this question is beyond
the scope of this Note.
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The only plausible interpretation of the statutes supports the ability to
remove nutrition and hydration under both statutes or the inability to do
so under both statutes. A tradition of patient autonomy in case law'
coupled with medical realities'8 only support the conclusion that nutrition
and hydration which are not medically appropriate may be subject to
removal under either statute.
CONCLUSION
The word "appropriate" in the Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging
Procedures Act should be read to permit the removal of artificial nutrition
and hydration when it serves as a "life-prolonging procedure" that prolongs
the dying process. This conclusion not only recognizes the plain meaning
of the statute itself, but it also recognizes judicial and medical support for
such a conclusion.
Since immunity from liability serves as a foundation for both statutes,
and since some interpretation questions exist, perhaps the legislature should
delete the exclusion of appropriate nutrition and hydration from the Act's
definition of "life-prolonging procedure." Nutrition and hydration, at least
that which is artificially provided, would then clearly represent medical
treatments. However, an amendment of the Living Wills Act would not be
necessary if the word "appropriate" is interpreted as suggested here.
Health care representatives find the authority under the Health Care
Consent Law to remove artificial nutrition and hydration when the patient
has expressed this desire or when the best interests of the patient require
it. When so directed by a surrogate decision maker determined to be capable
of making decisions for the patient, health care providers receive the
protection of the Health Care Consent Law even when the care in question
is artificial nutrition and hydration. The Living Wills Act and the Consent
Law should be viewed consistently with an eye toward allowing health care
providers flexibility when dealing with medical alternatives.
188. See supra notes 89-123 and accompanying text.
189. See'supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
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